In testimony before the Senate Thursday, Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that agents of Pakistan’s spy agency—Inter-services Intelligence, or I.S.I.—provided support for last week’s attack on the American Embassy in Kabul. That is stunning news. It may turn out to be the event that compels President Obama and his advisors to finally force significant changes in America’s alliance—the word is used lightly here—with Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders. As I suggested in a recent piece on Pakistan, we should not be surprised by the I.S.I.’s blatant venality, or by its willingness to act so aggressively against American interests, despite the billions of dollars Pakistan receives each year in aid.
The United States embassy was attacked on September 13th by a group of insurgents who American officials say came from the Haqqani network, an especially lethal group that is allied with the Taliban. The assault was extraordinarily brazen: the American Embassy is in downtown Kabul, and is adjacent to the headquarters for the American military and its NATO allies. Sixteen people were killed, including eleven civilians—six of them children. (The Embassy itself was not breached.) The Embassy attack was one in a series of spectacular operations, which have included assassinations and suicide bombings, that have contributed to a growing sense of demoralization among the Afghans and their American sponsors.
If the I.S.I. was indeed involved in the planning or direction of the Embassy attack, it would constitute the most dramatic evidence yet that the Pakistani military and security agencies are actively trying to subvert the American-led project in Afghanistan. But it would not be the first such evidence: American and Western officials have been saying for years that the I.S.I. actively supports Taliban and Haqqani insurgents who are killing American troops. In 2008, according to American officials, I.S.I. agents helped facilitate the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which killed fifty-four people. Privately, senior Pakistani officials have even referred to the Haqqani network as their strategic asset.
Stripped to its essence, the Pakistani rationale for supporting the Haqqani group is this: the Pakistanis don’t know if the United States is going to prevail in Afghanistan—all signs suggest that the American effort has peaked—and Pakistan wants to maintain an agent of influence inside Afghanistan that will advance its own interests if the U.S. fails. By backing Haqqani and the Taliban, of course, the I.S.I. makes that eventuality all the more likely.
What can the United States do? The answer is not as easy as it seems. As much as eighty-five per cent of NATO’s supplies and materiel in the region flows through Pakistan. The alternative routes—though Iran or Central Asia—are at least as problematic. That reliance has obviously led senior Pakistani officers to believe they can flout American demands—and even, it appears, help kill American and NATO soldiers.
But Pakistan’s leverage may not be as great as some of the country’s senior military leaders believe. American tolerance for Pakistan’s double game is waning fast, especially in Congress, as is American support for the war in Afghanistan. It might be a first, but don’t be surprised if this time, Pakistan—caught in the act—is forced to face the consequences of its actions.
Adm. Mike Mullen and Navy Rear Adm. Scott van Buskirk, with Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, head of the I.S.I., in 2008. Photograph by U.S. Navy, Spc. 1st Class William John Kipp Jr./AP Photo.
